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Management of the Murray–Darling river system involves a large number of users
with imprecisely deﬁned rights, and an aggregate rate of resource use that is environ-
mentally unsustainable. One possible policy response is to make formal or informal
contracts with users, under which users receive current beneﬁts in return for a
commitment to forgo usage rights in future. In this paper, this issue is explored with







In many resource management problems, the starting point is one involving a
large number of users with imprecisely deﬁned rights, and an aggregate rate
of resource use that is environmentally unsustainable. The situation of the
Murray–Darling Basin in the late 1980s ﬁtted this description closely. Existing
water allocations accounted for close to 100 per cent of average annual ﬂows,
and prevailing policies gave existing and potential users an expectation of
increased usage rights in the future. Because of the variability of annual ﬂows
in the Murray–Darling Basin, which is greater than that of any other major
river system in the world, it is possible to allocate more than 100 per cent of
the average annual ﬂow, and in some catchments this has been done.
One possible policy response, taking account of these characteristics of the
problem, is to make formal or informal contracts with users, under which
users receive current beneﬁts in return for a commitment to forgo usage
rights in the future. If users have high discount rates, this response may permit
a substantial reduction in use over time at relatively low cost.
The current situation in the Murray–Darling Basin provides an opportunity
for the adoption of such an approach. Most current licenses have been issued
for a ﬁxed term, normally 10 years in the case of New South Wales. There is
an expectation of renewal, but there remains the possibility of changes in
conditions, or even of withdrawal of rights, at the end of the term.
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The 10-year period is also signiﬁcant in relation to the possibility of changes
in rights. Under the agreement on the National Water Initiative announced at
the 2004 meeting of the Council of Australian Governments (CoAG), irrigators
bear the risk of reductions in water allocations associated with new scientiﬁc
knowledge until 2014. After that, risk is shared, with irrigators bearing the
ﬁrst 3 per cent and governments the rest. Thus, there is a possibility that the
allocations associated with existing rights due for renewal around 2014 will
be reduced before this date.
It seems likely that at least some users would be willing to forgo the pro-
spect of renewal of their rights in return for a current payment, on terms that
would yield improvements in sustainability at lower cost than the alternative
of acquiring current rights at market prices.
The object of the present paper is to consider the desirability and practicality




Quiggin (2001) presented a summary of developments in policy for management
of the Murray–Darling Basin from Federation to the late 1990s. This period
can be divided into two phases, adopting the classiﬁcation proposed by Randall
(1981). In the expansionary phase, from the beginning of irrigated agriculture
until the late 1980s, the main focus was on exploiting the resources of the system
to promote the development of intensive agriculture. Governments were willing
to support irrigation investments even when rates of return were low or negative.
Environmental problems and competition for water use became evident
during the 1970s and acute during the 1980s, signalling the arrival of the mature
phase in which the marginal social cost of water use is high and increasing
over time. As Randall notes, when the expansionary phase reaches its inevitable
end, and a mature water economy emerges, the problem of managing the resource
is complicated by the persistence of policies inherited from the expansionary
phase.
The most serious problems have arisen with attempts to create a market in
water rights, following the imposition of a limit on aggregate extractions, referred
to as the Cap, in 1995. The Cap was the ﬁrst step in the development of a
comprehensive policy response, referred to as the Living Murray Initiative
(Murray–Darling Basin Commission 2003).
Under the Cap, it was agreed that the total allocation of water from the
Murray–Darling Basin would not increase above the level prevailing in 1994.
In the future, any new allocation to one user would have to be matched by a
reduction for some other user. The need for water allocations to be trans-
ferred between users naturally raised the issue of trade.
The central idea of creating a market for trade in water rights is that rights
would be reallocated from low-value uses such as pasture to high-value uses
such as fruit and vegetables. Although this reallocation would not, in itself,
do anything for the environment, it would reduce the cost and the social and 
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economic dislocation associated with reductions in the aggregate allocation
of water.
It rapidly became apparent that this appealing idea was an oversimpliﬁca-
tion of the problem. Water is not a homogeneous commodity. Water in one place,
and at one time is not a good substitute for water in another place or at
another time. Because it is heavy and bulky, moving water from one place to
another or storing it over time is difﬁcult and expensive – this is why irrigation
is expensive.
Water is a complex commodity. The structure of rights created by a century of
water management is even more so. At the time of the 1994 meeting of the
CoAG, few or no water users possessed property rights comparable to titles
to land. The closest approximation was a license to take water, typically
attached to a particular piece of land. On the other hand, a great many existing
and potential users had expectations that water would be available to them.
As a result, the ﬁrst problem with water trading was to determine who had
water rights. An unanticipated difﬁculty arose with the emergence of ‘sleepers’
and ‘dozers’. These were landholders who had water licenses attached to their
land, but had never used them (sleepers) or had ceased to use them (dozers).
As soon as water became a tradable commodity, the licenses held by such
sleepers became a tradable commodity. As extractions from the Murray–
Darling Basin were already at or near 100 per cent of natural ﬂows in 1994,
it was not possible to allow both the allocation of water to ‘sleepers’ and
‘dozers’ and the continuation of existing allocations to users who did not pos-
sess  guaranteed rights. With some exceptions, the outcome was that users
who had been receiving water under various provisions, but who had no speciﬁc
entitlement, did not receive tradable rights, whereas sleepers’ rights were
upheld.
Policies for the management of the Murray–Darling were developed further at
the 2003 CoAG meeting, which produced an announcement (but not a detailed
speciﬁcation) of a set of policy proposals referred to as the National Water
Initiative (Council of Australian Governments 2003).
Two major principles were announced. The ﬁrst was that, in the future,
water allocations should be stated as shares of available water, rather than as
speciﬁc volumes. This approach deals with ﬂuctuations in water availability
by  sharing the total amount available among users in proportion to their
share. It raises the question of whether it will continue to be possible, as at
present, to distinguish between high-security and low-security rights. This
problem will no doubt be addressed in the future.
The second principle concerned an approach to the sharing of risk arising
from changes in the aggregate availability of water. Under this principle, the risk
of changes in water availability due to new knowledge about the hydrological
capacity of the system will be borne by users. The risk of reductions in water
availability arising from changes in public policy, such as changes in environ-
mental policy, will be borne by the public, and water users will receive com-
pensation for such reductions. 
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The principles of the National Water Initiative were elaborated in more
detail in a statement issued by the 2004 CoAG meeting (Council of Australian
Governments 2004). The Communique speciﬁed a framework that assigns
the risk of future reductions in water availability arising from (i) natural events





knowledge about water systems’ capacity to sustain particular extraction
levels; and (iii) changes in government policy.
The most important aspect of the framework, for the purposes of the
present paper, is the fact that rights may be signiﬁcantly modiﬁed, in the light
of new evidence about system capacity, until 2014, after which rights are substantially
secure. Around the same time, a substantial proportion of licenses will be due
for renewal.
 
1.1 The scientiﬁc review panel
 
A recent scientiﬁc survey undertaken as part of the Living Murray Initiative





annual ﬂows into the system are around 10 000 gigalitres (GL), and under
current policies, almost all of this ﬂow is allocated to extractive uses, primarily
irrigation. (For comparison, Sydney uses around 650 GL each year.) Three
options for restoring environmental ﬂows were considered, involving ﬂows of
350, 750, and 1500 GL. The scientiﬁc panel concluded that an environmental
flow of 1500 GL was needed to achieve even moderate ecological improvements.
This is not a surprising outcome. Past experience, such as that surrounding
the Snowy Flows agreement (restoring water ﬂow to the Snowy River) suggests
that somewhere between 15 and 30 per cent of natural ﬂows is needed if a
river system is to maintain its environmental health. Having been offered a
range of choices from 3 to 15 per cent, the scientiﬁc panel naturally chose the
ﬁgure at the top of the range.
But future reviews are likely to conclude that 1500 GL is not enough. To
achieve a genuinely satisfactory environmental outcome, a natural ﬂow of 3000
GL is probably needed. Looked at another way, 3000 GL per year is the amount
by which the demands of existing users and the needs of the environment exceed
the sustainable volume of water supplied by the Murray–Darling river system.
Considered in this light, the policy principles announced in the Living
Murray Initiative raise as many questions as they resolve. Existing public policy
calls for environmentally sustainable use, so it could be argued that the en-
vironmental ﬂow of 1500 GL called for by the scientiﬁc review panel does not
involve a change of policy. This does not seem likely to be an argument that will
commend itself to irrigators. Even more acute difﬁculties are likely to arise if
reductions in aggregate water use of more than 1500 GL are sought in the
future.
However, as these issues are resolved, it seems likely that the achievement
of a sustainable outcome will require the acquisition of water rights from irri-
gators on a substantial scale. 
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As was noted in the introduction, the starting point for reforms to the man-
agement of the Murray–Darling Basin is one involving a large number of
users with imprecisely deﬁned rights, and an aggregate rate of resource use
that is environmentally unsustainable.
In a standard property rights analysis, the response to a problem of this
kind is straightforward. After the socially optimal level of use has been deter-
mined, tradable resource use rights equal, in aggregate, to the optimal level
should be created and allocated. In the absence of transactions costs, it does
not matter whether governments achieve this goal by withdrawing existing
licences to the extent that the aggregate usage level exceeds the social optimum,
then making the remaining rights legally enforceable and tradable property
rights, or by making all existing licences legally enforceable and tradable and
then repurchasing rights to achieve the socially optimal level. Moreover, if new
knowledge implies a need for a reduction in the aggregate level of resource
use rights, these can be purchased from users. Issues such as the distribution
of rights and the required payment, if any, are seen as purely distributional,
and therefore amenable to resolution through lump-sum compensation.
In reality, there are problems with each of the simple alternatives, namely,
terminating all existing licenses at expiry and starting afresh or converting all
existing licenses into secure property rights. As discussed above, it is evident
that the optimal volume of rights will be greater than zero, but less than the total
implied by existing licences and entitlements of various kinds. Hence, either
of the simple alternatives will yield a starting point where the aggregate volume
of water use implied by existing rights will be far from the socially optimal level.
Consider ﬁrst the option of cancelling existing licenses at expiry, and auc-
tioning newly created rights. Obviously, this involves a substantial redistribution
of wealth away from existing users, who have a reasonable, if imprecise,
expectation that their current licenses possess a renewal option. Almost certainly,
such a redistribution would involve a reduction in social welfare, even with
no change in the aggregate volume of rights. On the other hand, if newly created
rights are distributed freely, or at below-market prices, to some class of exist-
ing users, the process creates incentives for rent-seeking lobbying and so on.
The converse problem arises with the option of enhancing the status of
existing licenses and other attenuated property rights. The option of converting
all existing licenses involves the creation of an excessive volume of rights. In
the absence of lump-sum sources of revenue, repurchase of these rights will
involve welfare losses. On the other hand, the option of terminating some
categories of licences while enhancing others has obvious distributional
implications and is likely to imply substantial incentives for rent-seeking
behavior, as marginal changes in the classiﬁcation of particular rights can
have substantial costs or beneﬁts for their holders.
All of these problems have already been observed in the ﬁrst round of
water market reforms during the 1990s. The policy approach adopted in the 
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1990s may be described as one of making existing licences more akin to
standard property rights, while repudiating less formal claims derived from
historical usage, promises and expectations. The introduction of tradable
water rights created windfall gains for holders of sleeper and dozer rights,
and led to an expansion in the effective volume of water rights while imposing
costs on water users with less secure rights.
These difﬁculties are exacerbated by information problems. Our understanding
of the hydrology of the Murray–Darling system, of the possible implications
of climate change, and of the economic implications of alternative policy
options is incomplete, but is likely to improve over time. Hence, there are
substantial potential gains from ﬂexibility in the design of property rights. As
noted by Randall (1974), whenever transactions costs are signiﬁcant, there is
an inevitable trade-off between security and ﬂexibility in the structure of
property rights. One way of stating the key insight of Coase (1960) is to
observe that this trade-off is less favourable, the further is the initial alloca-
tion of rights from the socially optimal allocation.
The importance of transactions costs in determining the outcomes of trade
in water markets has become increasingly evident. Challen (2000) provides a
discussion of the issues.
 
2.1 Repurchase of renewal rights
 
As noted above, one possible policy response arises from the fact that most
current licences are for a ﬁxed term with an expectation of renewal, but with
the possibility of changes in conditions, or even of withdrawal of rights, at, or
near, the end of the term.
Examination of market prices suggests that some water users would be
willing to sell their renewal rights relatively cheaply. Permanent water trades





A400 per megalitre (ML), whereas temporary trades, which take












, they imply some combination
of high discount rates and a low value for the renewal option associated with
‘permanent’ rights. For any such combination, the implied present value of
the renewal right is small.
This point is illustrated in Table 1, where, for illustrative convenience, it is




A400/ML and the value of




A80/ML. Thus, if renewal is treated as automatic, so












If temporary trades take place primarily in periods of water shortages (surpluses), the




Because the payments are annual, the implied internal rate of return is slightly less than 20
per cent. 
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assumed automatic, the future value of the right at the renewal date 10 years




A400/ML. Discounting over 10 years at a rate of 20 per cent




A69. Even lower present values arise if the future
value of the renewal option is lower than the present value of a permanent
right. It should be noted, however, that the markets are relatively thin, parti-
cularly in relation to long-term trades, and that there are constraints on
trades between catchments.
There are a number of possible explanations of the implied low value of
renewal rights, including possible market failures and imperfect rationality
on the part of market participants. However, assuming that the private rate
of discount is closer to 10 per cent than to 20 per cent, it seems reasonable to
suppose that, at least in part, the low valuation reﬂects uncertainty surrounding
the nature of rights that will emerge as a result of the current policy debate.
As has already been argued, there is no simple method of resolving this
uncertainty in the short term that does not involve substantial social costs.
If the values estimated in Table 1 are accurate, a small investment in the re-
purchase of renewal rights could signiﬁcantly increase the ﬂexibility of policy
options in 10 years’ time. Assuming that the values of future natural ﬂows





, such a proposal would yield an apparent Pareto-improve-
ment relative to the immediate purchase of permanent rights. The present
social value of a future reduction in water use would exceed the private
present value of the associated renewal right. However, it has frequently been
the case that apparent Pareto-improvements are illusory on closer inspection.
It is therefore desirable to consider this issue more closely.
 
2.2 Discounting and welfare
 
The idea that high individual discount rates may lead to excessive rates of
environmental degradation has been discussed extensively for many years




The case for using the real bond rate in evaluation of public investments has been debated
at length. A recent restatement, drawing on the literature on the ‘equity premium’, is presented
by Grant and Quiggin (2003).
Table 1 Estimated present value of renewal rights 
Renewal probability 1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.25 0
Implied discount rate (%) 19.2 18.3 17.4 16.9 15.4 13.7
Present Value of renewal right (#/ML) 69.1 59.5 48.4 42.1 23.8 0.0
Notes: The implied discount rate is the internal rate of return r that sets 
where: V is the price of a permanent water right (#400);
v is the price of a temporary trade (#80);
pt = 1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 10 and for t > 10, pt is the renewal probability; and the Present Value is the 
value, at t = 0, of the stream vpt beginning at t = 10, discounted at the rate r.
Vr v p tt
t
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problems may be addressed by paying polluters to forgo explicit or implicit
rights to pollute may be traced back to Coase (1960).
Now, consider a policy interaction between these two ideas. More speciﬁcally,
consider the option of making a present payment to a polluter with a high
discount rate in return for a commitment to cede pollution rights at some
future date. The beneﬁt–cost analysis for such a proposal is simple, and, at
ﬁrst sight, compelling.
Consider a simple example. Suppose that the social rate of discount is
4 per cent and a polluter with a discount rate of 10 per cent has a right to





A100, and can take place in 10 years’ time. Then the present value




A37, whereas the present value




A75. Hence, a policy that pays the polluter his
private valuation now in return for ceding the pollution right has a beneﬁt–
cost ratio of 2.
There are, however, obvious difﬁculties. In terms of the arithmetic, it is





A120, implying that the cessation of the pollution right would reduce
future welfare. This appears to imply some form of policy inconsistency. In
terms of the standard market failure framework, it is not clear what market





In considering the validity of a proposition yielding an apparent Pareto-
improvement, a number of checks are appropriate. One such check is suggested
by the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics. As a competitive
market equilibrium is Pareto-optimal under the conditions of the theorem,
any feasible Pareto-improvement must reduce the welfare loss caused by one
or more missing markets. Hence, it is necessary to identify the missing market
in question.
Second, it is necessary to consider whether an alternative policy could
yield a superior outcome. In particular, it is necessary to examine whether it
is feasible to create the missing markets, the absence of which justiﬁes the policy.




critique. One critique of this kind arises if the conditions required for the
policy in question to yield a Pareto-improvement also imply that other policies
would be welfare improving when there are strong grounds to suppose that





 critique arises if the policy gives rise to unbounded (or large) arbi-
trage opportunities.
On the ﬁrst point, as has already been noted, the capacity of the policy to
generate welfare improvement depends on the absence of a market for
renewal rights. The difﬁculties of specifying rights precisely appear to preclude 
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the creation of such a market. However, they do not appear to prevent governm-
ents from offering to repurchase renewal rights from the holders of such rights.
However, this market failure is necessary but not sufﬁcient for welfare
improvement. In addition, it is necessary that there should exist one or more
capital market failures leading to the existence of a difference between the
discount rate facing farmers and that facing governments.
To formalise these claims, consider the case where there exists a market for
renewal rights. In this case, any welfare beneﬁts achieved through the policy
under consideration could equally be achieved by making loans to farmers at
a rate lying between the public and private discount rates. As such a policy
would normally be welfare reducing in the absence of a solution to the capi-






Now, consider the case where there is no difference in discount rates. In
this case, there is no beneﬁt associated with repurchasing rights now rather
than immediately prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding renewal. If,
as seems likely, advance repurchase involves additional transactions costs, it
would reduce welfare relative to the alternative of deferred repurchase.





As renewal rights are not speciﬁed exactly at present, the question of how
they might legally be relinquished is problematic. One possibility would be to
create a new class of ‘terminating’ rights, and offer payments to users who
are willing to convert their existing rights to terminating rights. In formal
terms, there is not much distinction between terminating rights with a dura-
tion of 10 years and the 1-year temporary licences that are currently traded.
Next, there is the question of credible commitment. Having accepted a
cash payment in return for the relinquishment of renewal rights, some or all
water users might seek to repudiate or renegotiate the agreement when their
licences expired. The risk of such an outcome depends on a variety of factors,
such as the capacity of water users to exert political pressure on governments.
The fact that the proposal rests on individual agreements, entered voluntarily,
tends to increase the credibility of users’ commitments to relinquish rights.
Another possible point at which users might seek renegotiation arises
when the details of renewal rights are speciﬁed. Users might argue that they
were not properly informed about the rights they were relinquishing. The risk
of dispute would increase if crucial details were not speciﬁed until close to, or
even after, the renewal date. Thus, it would be preferable to specify the details
of renewal rights well before the expiry of current rights.
Considering these issues, the most promising approach to implementation
would be to experiment with one or more small-scale initiatives. A number of
possible outcomes might arise. 
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First, irrigators might show little or no interest in participating in a market
for rights in the relatively distant future, whatever its theoretical attractions.
The absence of farmer interest has led to the demise of futures markets in a
number of commodities, despite the apparent beneﬁts of such markets for
risk management, and the same problem might arise in relation to water
rights.
Second, the anomalous relationship between short-term and long-term
prices might disappear even with only a small intervention. This would sug-
gest that the anomaly was the result of thin markets and that the problems of
risk and uncertainty about future rights were not as severe as is commonly
supposed. In this case, a standing offer of repurchase of renewal rights might
help the performance of the market, yielding small but positive beneﬁts.
Third, the offer of repurchase might create arbitrage opportunities for private
agents not subject to the transactions costs which are required if a gap
between permanent and temporary trade prices is to persist. At present, if
any such arbitrage is taking place, it is on a very small scale, but, as the
example of ‘sleeper’ rights suggests, changes in the nature and tradability of
property rights can often have unexpected consequences, and arbitrage
opportunities rarely go unexploited for long.
Finally, the most favorable case would be one in which there was a signi-
ﬁcant volume of trade, bringing temporary and permanent trade prices closer
to equilibrium, but not eliminating the price discrepancy altogether. In this
case, a general offer of repurchase of renewal rights might be expected to
achieve both a reduction in the gap between the current volume of water
rights and the sustainable volume and an improvement in the efﬁciency of








The problems of the Murray–Darling Basin have developed over more than
100 years, and will not be resolved rapidly. In most cases, the adverse con-
sequences of excessive water use have developed slowly over time and will
continue to do so. By contrast, the costs of adjustment to lower levels of
extractive water use are acute and immediate.
In these circumstances, there is a strong case for policies that take account
of the difference between the discount rates applicable to public investments
in sustainable management and those faced by water users. The option of




A referee observes that there is an ‘implicit transactions costs argument that welfare
would be improved if as 2014 approaches the government has just about the right amount of
rights in hand to provide for ﬂow requirements. In such a case, the chances of non-renewal
would diminish and rights in private hands would become more secure as 2014 approaches. So,
the proposed purchase of rights from willing sellers motivated mostly by uncertainty in these
rights would actually make everyone else’s rights more secure’. 
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